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Abstract: 
Forest loss and land use changes associated with agricultural expansion, urban development and 
bioenergy production are key concerns for many governments and forest-dependent communities 
around the world. Several strategies exist to address forest loss, including market-based 
mechanisms that promote good forest governance such as the Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation program that includes enhancements in biodiversity and 
livelihoods (REDD+) and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification. Many positive 
outcomes result from forest governance programs like REDD+ and FSC, including payments, 
increased stakeholder participation, and dissemination of knowledge among forest dependent 
communities. However, the distribution of and satisfaction with these outcomes is highly 
contextualized and variable at the community level. The objective of this paper is to analyze and 
understand the ways in which REDD+ and FSC program design and implementation impact the 
distribution of, and satisfaction with, program benefits at the community level. Specifically, this 
paper analyzes three study sites in Southeastern Tanzania implementing these programs. Our 
study finds that forest conservation programs have the opportunity to either exacerbate or 
ameliorate underlying disparity caused by spatial asymmetry in rural communities in 
Southeastern Tanzania. Different benefit-sharing and implementation mechanisms are shown to 
exhibit varying levels of success in overcoming baseline inequalities, and appear to be more 
important in determining community level benefits, participation, and knowledge sharing than 
inherent programmatic differences between REDD+ and FSC. 
 
1. Introduction: 
Forest loss and land use changes associated with agricultural expansion, urban development and 
bioenergy production are key concerns for many governments and forest-dependent communities 
around the world (IPCC 2008). Several strategies exist to address forest loss including market-
based mechanisms and regulation (Long 2010). In order to increase stakeholder participation in 
these mechanisms and ultimately reduce global deforestation, good governance must be a central 
component of program implementation (Andersson and Agrawal 2011, Bhattarai and Hammig 
2004). The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation program that 
includes enhancements in biodiversity and livelihoods (REDD+) and the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) certification are examples of participatory, market-based forest governance 
mechanisms that stress good governance in forest conservation.  
Forest governance programs like REDD+ and FSC provide tangible and intangible benefits to 
implementing communities, including revenues in the form of cash payments, increased 
stakeholder participation, and the transfer of knowledge to forest dependent communities 
(Scriven 2012, Pinto and McDermott 2013). The objective of this paper is to analyze and 
understand the ways in which REDD+ and FSC program design and implementation impact the 
distribution of and satisfaction with program benefits at the community level. 
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Specifically, this paper analyzes three study sites in Southeastern Tanzania implementing 
different combinations of REDD+ and FSC. These programs were chosen for analysis because 
program revenues constitute a significant portion of each site’s total community income and 
neither program has predetermined how benefits are distributed within a community. 
Furthermore, Tanzania provides a unique geographic context in which to explore these issues; 
the spatial arrangement of rural villages has been heavily influenced by the historical process of 
villagisation, a program which aimed to cluster disparate rural populations into formalized 
villages in order to improve rural production and economic self-reliance (Briggs 1979). As a 
result, the contemporary Tanzanian village structure is prone to geospatial inequalities in power, 
wealth and education, which can influence the distribution of benefits from REDD+ and FSC 
within a community. 
Overall, we argue that forest conservation programs have the opportunity to either exacerbate or 
ameliorate underlying disparity caused by spatial asymmetry in rural communities. Different 
benefit-sharing and program implementation mechanisms exhibit varying levels of success in 
overcoming baseline socioeconomic asymmetries, and appear to be more important in 
determining community level benefit, participation, and knowledge perceptions than the type of 
forest conservation program chosen (i.e. REDD+ or FSC).  
This paper explores the ways in which REDD+ and FSC program design and implementation 
impact the distribution of and satisfaction with benefits at the community and individual levels in 
Southeastern Tanzania. In order to do so, we first detail a brief history of REDD+ and FSC and 
contextualize the two programs in Tanzania. For further context, our study sites and 
methodology utilized for data collection and analysis are explored. Next, the results of the study 
are split into two sections. The first section focuses on the distribution of direct payments from 
REDD+ and FSC, the impacts of which are heavily influenced by spatial dynamics within each 
community. The second section outlines the effectiveness of and participants’ satisfaction with 
their knowledge and participation in decision-making regarding REDD+ and FSC. These results 
are explored spatially and demographically, highlighting key differences in the effectiveness and 
equitability of implementation techniques. Finally, both sections are examined for similar 
characteristics and recommendations are made for implementing organizations to overcome 
spatial asymmetry at the community level. 
1.1 REDD+ vs. FSC: History and Benefits for Participating Communities in Tanzania 
REDD+ and FSC are market-based forest governance strategies intended to provide tangible and 
intangible benefits to participating communities. The United Nations (UN) created the REDD+ 
protocol in 2009 as a policy instrument to mitigate carbon emissions through payments to 
communities and landowners in exchange for forest conservation ultimately resulting in 
increased carbon sequestration and improved community livelihoods and biodiversity 
(Mustalahti et al. 2012). REDD+ Readiness preparations began in 2008 in anticipation of 
international REDD+ funding (Burgess et al. 2010), and Tanzania underwent a REDD+ pilot 
phase from 2009 to 2013 to build institutional capacity for the future expansion of REDD+ and 
evaluate potential policy options moving forward. During this time, non-governmental 
organizations were given broad design and implementation license to establish each pilot project 
(Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2012).  
FSC was established after the 1992 UN Earth Summit; as a non-profit organization that promotes 
responsible forest management through a forest certification program (FSC 2013). There are 
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various types of FSC certificates available to communities as well as the public and private 
sector (FSC 2014). FSC certificates, like most certifications, are costly for small-scale forest 
managers like rural communities in Tanzania (Pinto and McDermott 2013). To address this 
issue, FSC recently created a group certification to expand the program’s applicability to small-
scale forests and increase access of FSC certification to smallholders (FSC 2014). The group 
certification enables multiple communities or landowners to pool resources and apply for a 
single certificate for all of the forests under their management (ibid). In 2009, the first FSC 
certificate of this type in Africa was granted to the Mpingo Conservation and Development 
Initiative (MCDI) (MCDI 2012). MCDI works with communities in the Kilwa District of 
Southeastern Tanzania, where valuable African blackwood, also known as mpingo, is harvested 
and sold primarily for wind instrument production (FSC 2012). While the majority of FSC 
certificates have traditionally been awarded in industrialized countries (Pinto and McDermott 
2013, Rametsteiner and Simula 2003), FSC has expanded into less-industrialized countries 
through their group certificate, creating new opportunities for analysis of its implementation and 
impacts at this scale (FSC 2014, Pinto and McDermott 2013).  
REDD+ and FSC utilize different approaches to achieve forest conservation and success is 
largely determined by their respective implementing organizations. The primary goal of both 
programs is to reduce forest loss through forest conservation or sustainable forest management 
(Brown et al. 2011, Pinto and McDermott 2013). However, secondary outcomes such as 
equitable benefit-sharing and increased stakeholder participation are also aspects of each 
program (Scriven 2012, Pinto and McDermott 2013).  
This paper focuses on three REDD+ and FSC program benefits: direct payments, participation in 
program related decision-making, and the transfer of forest governance knowledge to 
participating communities (Gebara 2013, Peskett et al. 2008, Börner et al. 2010, Pinto and 
McDermott 2013). In the case of REDD+ and FSC, payments can be managed in many ways as 
neither program predetermines how revenue streams must be distributed within communities 
(Makala 2013, Meshack 2013). In Tanzania, participating villages in conjunction with 
implementing organizations, have chosen various mechanisms to distribute revenues from 
REDD+ and FSC, including individual cash payments and/or earmarking revenues for 
community development projects (referred to from now on as community projects) (Tanzania 
Natural Resource Forum 2012; Makala 2013). Each payment mechanism, or combination of 
mechanisms, can compensate for opportunity costs associated with program participation and 
serve different groups within a community, thereby producing varying effects on the distribution 
of tangible benefits (Börner et al. 2010, Peskett et al. 2008). 
Participation in decision-making spaces and increased knowledge about program content are 
important intangible benefits for participating communities (Mahanty and McDermott 2013, 
Gebara 2013, Thornber 2003). REDD+ and FSC strive to achieve equitable participation and 
decision-making in their programs, and a basic understanding of program design, content, and 
implementation at the individual and community levels is required to accomplish this (Gebara 
2013). UN safeguards for REDD+ aim to ensure a net positive impact on communities, including 
the “full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders” (Scriven 2012). Additionally, the 
FSC group certification was introduced to make the program more inclusive and participatory. 
There are several methods for measuring level of understanding and participation including 
individual measures of satisfaction, which are important because they provide insight into each 
person’s desire and ability to engage with REDD+ or FSC.  
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Beyond the central goal of REDD+ and FSC, equitable benefit sharing and program participation 
are desired outcomes of each program. The distribution of and satisfaction with these benefits 
depend highly on the context and manner in which they are implemented.  
1.2 Spatial Dynamics and Program Implementation in Tanzania  
As mentioned previously, the villagisation process in Tanzania has produced unique spatial 
arrangements within rural villages that ultimately impact REDD+ and FSC program 
implementation. Following the country’s independence from British colonial rule in 1961, 
President Julius Nyerere adopted a socialist ideology that determined Tanzania’s political, social 
and economic development over the ensuing decades (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003). Given the 
highly dispersed geographical arrangement of the country’s rural population, Nyerere 
implemented a program of villagisation to group distant rural populations into formalized 
villages, requiring the involuntary resettlement and relocation of rural farmers into more 
centralized locations. Villagisation was meant to enable communal agricultural production, and 
to ease the burden on the central government in its efforts to provide social services to rural 
communities (Hyden 1975).  
However, because many rural Tanzanians resisted relocation, newly formed village boundaries 
often included distant hubs, called ‘subvillages’, with smaller populations that had little contact 
with or connection to the larger population center of their village (Briggs 1979). As a result, the 
Tanzanian village structure is prone to geospatial inequalities in power, wealth and education due 
to the concentration of social services and village-level decision-making structures in the village 
center, which are difficult for distant subvillage populations to access. As various studies have 
shown, proximity to social services such as roads, schools, wells, or health clinics determines the 
level at which an individual can benefit from these services, and can lead to inequity within a 
community (Castro-Leal et al. 2000, Handa 2002, Sultana 2006, Rahman and Smith 2000). The 
three study sites included in this paper were subjected to villagisation in the early 1970s and 
exhibit characteristics of spatially driven disparity. 
In this context, Tanzania, in recent years, implemented a progressive and innovative system of 
decentralized Participatory Forest Management (PFM), which provides increased autonomy to 
forest-dependent communities to sustainably manage and receive livelihood benefits from their 
forests (Mustalahati et al. 2012). Both REDD+ and FSC in Tanzania have the potential to 
enhance PFM and impact the above-mentioned socioeconomic imbalances through the targeted 
distribution of benefits in participating communities. While the national level policy context in 
which REDD+ and FSC were established in Tanzania is important, community level dynamics 
play a more nuanced and critical role in shaping benefit distributions at the local scale. Our study 
sites are described below in order to provide additional detail about the implementing 
communities chosen for our analysis. 
 
2. Study Site 
Three villages located in the Lindi Region of Southeastern Tanzania were chosen for this study: 
Muungano, Nainokwe, and Kikole (Table 1, Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3). Miombo woodlands, 
comprised of a diverse distribution of grasses, sedges, shrubs, palms, and dispersed trees 
(Malmer, 2007; Campbell, 1996), dominate the forest ecosystem of the region and provide 
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valuable forest products essential for the livelihoods of the majority of rural communities 
(MCDI, 2012). Most villagers in this region rely on subsistence farming and use shifting 
agricultural methods (Makala 2013, Meshack 2013). 









NGO Involvement Program  Forested area 
under program 
(hectares) 
Muungano Lindi 2,300 7 Working with TFCG 
since 2010 
REDD+ 6,434 
Nainokwe Kilwa 447 2 Working with MCDI 
since 2010 
FSC 8,502 
Kikole Kilwa 1,200 3 Working with MCDI 
since 2006 
FSC 454  
 
 
For its REDD+ pilot project in Muungano, the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) 
distributed an initial trial payment to the village totaling approximately $32,200 USD. TFCG 
encouraged the community to choose how the funds would be disbursed and villagers decided 
through a majority vote to reserve 80% for individual cash payments and 20% for community 
projects. Each person received a cash payment of approximately $10 USD. The remaining funds 
were used to build a village office and provide furniture for the local school. TFCG also focused 
on addressing the drivers of deforestation through the promotion of alternative livelihood 
training in the village, such as beekeeping, chicken keeping, and conservation agriculture. 
Villagers in Nainokwe and Kikole adopted a different method of benefit sharing for their FSC 
project implemented by MCDI, in which revenues were entirely spent on forest management and 
community projects rather than individual cash payments. Villagers further decided to distribute 
the revenue from FSC timber sales accordingly: the village government handles 50%, the Village 
Natural Resource Council (VNRC) handles 45%, and 5% is paid as a tax to the district 
government. 
Nainokwe received a total of approximately $21,800 USD from its two initial sales of FSC 
certified timber. The village government utilized its 50% revenue allocation to construct houses 
for the Village Executive Officer (VEO) and the village midwife, build a village office, supply 
health insurance for the elderly, and provide occasional school meals for children. Importantly, 
each of the buildings constructed are located in the village center, as is the school where lunches 
were served. The VNRC dedicated its 45% share of the revenues toward the funding of forest 
patrols, the purchase of forest monitoring and management equipment, and meeting allowances 
for VNRC members. 
Kikole has sold FSC certified timber twice since 2009, receiving a total of $4,375 USD. The 
village government used its portion of revenues to purchase and install a motorized water tap and 
to construct a nurse’s house, both in the village center. The VNRC dedicated its allotment to 
fund forest management activities, forest patrols, meeting allowances, and office supplies for 




Data was collected from May through July 2013 using the International Forestry Resources and 
Institutions (IFRI) methodology. IFRI is a global research network that examines how 
governance arrangements affect forests and the people who depend on them through a suite of 
qualitative and quantitative surveys (IFRI 2014). In each study site, focus groups and household 
surveys were conducted to understand perceptions of participation and satisfaction with forest 
governance, REDD+, and FSC. The main stakeholder groups interviewed include (Table 2): 
• Forest Governance Officials: District Forest Officers, village government officials, 
Village Natural Resources Committee (VNRC) members, and management from the two 
implementing NGOs: TFCG and MCDI.  
• Village-Level Forest User Groups: Formal and informal village groups that use forests, 
including timber harvesters, beekeepers, food-gatherers, and charcoal producers. 
• Households: A random sample of households stratified by subvillage was selected for 
interviews. 
All interviews were conducted in Swahili by a native speaker using paper surveys that were 
subsequently recorded electronically. 
Table 2. Number of focus groups and interviews completed in each village. 





Muungano 4 3 35 
Nainokwe 3 2 30 
Kikole 3 3 30 
 
3.1 Data Analysis 
Qualitative data collected during the household surveys was coded for statistical comparison and 
all data were analyzed for trends in responses across various socioeconomic indicators using 
comparison-of-means tests and linear regression.  
In order to analyze wealth distributions within and between the three villages, a wealth index was 
created from a list of assets and food security measures assessed in the household surveys. 
Variables include ownership of land, livestock, bicycles/motorcycles, mobile phones, and other 
important household assets, which were weighted according to relative value gleaned from the 
household surveys. Income was not included in this index because a majority of respondents 
could not accurately recall their yearly earnings, which are highly variable. The lowest quartile 
of respondents was labeled “poor,” the middle two quartiles were considered “average,” and the 
highest quartile was coded as “wealthy.” A sensitivity analysis was conducted adjusting all the 
values of the index by factors of two and three, and found that over 99% and 90% of households 
respectively remained in their socioeconomic classification.  
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In addition to the wealth index, an access index was created in order to analyze the spatial 
organization of subvillages within each village. Social services including schools, wells, village 
government offices, and markets are concentrated in the village center. The index is therefore a 
composite of two factors which impact a participant’s ability to travel to the village center and 
access these services and amenities: travel time to the village center and the presence of seasonal 
travel barriers such as ephemeral rivers or flood zones. The values in the index are ordinal, 
ranging from one to four, with low numbers representing easy access to the village center and 
high numbers representing difficult access (Table 3). Each subvillage was assigned to an access 
zone based on the following criteria: 
Zone 1: Contains the village center and subvillages within a 5-20 minute walk, without any 
seasonal barriers. 
Zone 2: Contains subvillages that are within a 20-45 minute walk from the village center, 
without any seasonal barriers. 
Zone 3: Contains subvillages that are within a 1-2 hour walk from the village center with no 
seasonal travel constraints, or subvillages that are within a 20-45 minute walk from village center 
with seasonal barriers. 
Zone 4: Contains subvillages that are a 2+-hour walk from the village center with seasonal travel 
barriers.  
Table 3. Assignment of each subvillage to access zones. 
Village Name 
 





Umoja 1 360 
Mnazi Moja 1 465 
Naruwi 2 180 
Uleka 2 425 
Likonde 3 140 
Kipunga 3 870 
Nainokwe Nainokwe 1 390 
Kichonda 4 130 
Kikole Kikole 1 1100 
Nanyati 3 350 
Mbunga 4 200 
1=most accessible, 4=least accessible 
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The geographic arrangements of each village are visualized in maps drawn by community 
members and later digitized in ArcGIS 10.2, identifying the location of services, subvillages, 
forests, and rivers (Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3). 
 
Figure 1. Map of Muungano village including access zones, conserved forest location, and 
critical social services. 
 





Figure 3. Map of Kikole village including access zones, conserved forest location, and critical 
social services. 
 
Analysis of the data and indices across different indicators revealed a number of interesting 
patterns, which are explored below. 
 
4. Spatial Analysis of Benefit Distribution 
4.1 Spatial asymmetries within the modern Tanzanian village 
A clear understanding of the baseline socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of a 
community is necessary in order to be able to evaluate the equitability of benefit distribution in 
forest governance programs such as REDD+ and FSC (Peskett et al. 2008). Given the reality that 
nearly all communities will have at least some level of disparity in wealth, education, and 
political power among their members (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Spiteri and Nepal 2005), 
understanding the contours of these pre-existing trends allows for a more accurate evaluation of 
the impacts of conservation programs (Andersson and Agrawal 2011, Meshack et al. 2005, 
Peskett et al. 2008). Following Ribot and Peluso (2003), we draw upon the notion of ‘access,’ or 
“the ability to derive benefits from things,” as a theoretical framework for understanding the way 
in which the spatial distribution of program participants and centralized social services within a 
village creates an underlying and pre-existing asymmetry, which ultimately mediates the benefit 
distribution mechanisms of forest conservation programs. The access index is useful in 
quantifying differences that were clearly evident among residents of different subvillages 
concerning their ability to access social services at the village center. In addition, the index 
enables an analysis of the impacts of spatial distribution on program outcomes and benefit 
sharing arrangements. 
We repeatedly noticed the important role that village level spatial arrangements play in 
contributing to baseline asymmetries and access within communities through our household 
surveys. Residents of the most distant subvillages are consistently disadvantaged by their 
physical separation from activities and services concentrated in the village center and 
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respondents repeatedly voiced their frustration with this difficulty. For instance, many residents 
living in Muungano’s farthest subvillages complained of trouble accessing clean water since the 
village's cleanest water tap was located so far away. Children living in Nainokwe’s most distant 
subvillage, Kichonda, faced great difficulties in traveling to the school located a few hours’ walk 
away from their homes; children of Kikole’s two most distant subvillages were unable to attend 
school during the rainy season. These anecdotes illuminate the reality of disparity in access to 
basic services within these villages and demonstrate the context of asymmetry and inequity into 
which the REDD+ and FSC programs are intervening. 
4.2 Equitability of Payment Mechanisms: Balancing Costs and Benefits 
Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of spatiality in shaping community dynamics 
and mediating the impacts of benefit distribution for program participants (Castro-Leal et al. 
2000, Handa 2002, Sultana 2006, Rahman and Smith 2000). A primary component of forest 
governance initiatives such as REDD+ and FSC is the provision of direct monetary or in-kind 
benefits to program participants. Assessing the ways in which this benefit provision interacts 
with or impacts existing power dynamics in target communities is necessary to understand the 
equitability of the programs’ benefit distribution arrangements. Furthermore, participation in 
REDD+ and FSC exact varying opportunity costs for different groups of participants and 
equitable benefit distribution would theoretically entail a balancing of these costs with program 
benefits for all participants (Börner et al. 2010, Sommerville et al. 2010, Peskett et al. 2008, 
Brown et al. 2011).  
From our discussions with community members in the three study sites, it is clear that 
individuals relying more directly upon the forests placed under protection through REDD+ or 
FSC bear higher opportunity costs than individuals with less reliance on these areas. 
Furthermore, dependence on forests is more common for participants in distant subvillages, 
which are generally located closer to the conserved forest areas. Residents of Muungano’s most 
distant subvillages complained of losing their right to farm in the forest, which they did before 
the implementation of REDD+. Respondents from Kichonda, Nainokwe’s most distant 
subvillage, reported that FSC prohibited them from practicing subsistence hunting in the new 
FSC conservation area. In general, these anecdotes illustrate the higher than average opportunity 
costs associated with program participation for villagers living in Zones 3 and 4, where we 
would therefore expect to see proportionally larger benefit distributions in order for the benefits 
to be considered equitable.  
4.2.1 Benefit Distribution Approaches 
REDD+ and FSC are primarily strategies to provide financial rewards to communities in return 
for the sustainable management of forest resources. Both programs allow for a wide degree of 
freedom for implementing agencies and communities to determine the ways in which these 
monetary benefits will be distributed. The two NGOs implementing REDD+ and FSC in the case 
study villages adopted distinct benefit sharing arrangements, which had differing levels of 
success in overcoming the preexisting spatial disparities that have thus far been described.  
The principal difference between the benefit distribution approaches adopted by the three 
communities is the degree to which the benefits were distributed individually or communally, 
through individual cash payments versus community projects. This affects how successful each 
approach is in overcoming the unique challenges and opportunity costs facing residents of distant 
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subvillages. We now turn to an analysis of the impacts of each of these benefit distribution 
approaches, seeking to uncover their relative advantages and disadvantages in promoting 
equitable benefit sharing, as well as effective development assistance. 
4.2.2 Equity Outcomes of Individual Versus Community Payments 
Forest management programs such as REDD+ and FSC, through the strategic distribution of 
cash payments and community projects, have the potential to ameliorate, exacerbate, or simply 
perpetuate the pre-existing spatial disparities that characterize participating Tanzanian 
communities. The three case study villages involved in this study allow for a comparison of 
NGO strategies regarding program design and implementation, which appear to have been 
important in determining the extent to which existing spatial inequalities among village residents 
were meaningfully addressed. 
Our findings suggest that the approach in both Nainokwe and Kikole of using all FSC revenues 
to fund community development projects resulted in the exacerbation of existing spatial 
asymmetries that marginalize residents living in distant subvillages. The majority of the 
community projects implemented disproportionately benefitted either village leaders—such as 
the VEO or VNRC members—or residents living in subvillages close to the village center. 
Improving health services through the construction of houses for the nurse and midwife, 
expanding water provision through the purchase of a motorized water tap, and enhancing school 
support services through the expansion of the school meal program are all interventions that have 
greater proportional benefits for residents living near to the village center due to their location. 
These residents already had a comparative advantage in accessing centrally located social 
services, and the community projects resulting from FSC revenues only expanded this disparity 
between near and distant residents. In addition, as previously noted, residents with low access to 
the village center tend to face higher opportunity costs as a result of program participation. 
Therefore, their proportion of costs to benefits is even higher, represents a significant 
exacerbation of spatial disparities, and is therefore highly inequitable. 
In contrast, the approach adopted by residents of Muungano to distribute benefits primarily 
through individual cash payments appears to have been more successful in avoiding the 
centralizing tendencies of community development projects. In the context of existing spatial 
asymmetries in access to social services and program related opportunity costs, individual cash 
payments are an effective mechanism to bypass the authority of the village government, 
minimizing the potential for elite capture of benefits and for the selection of community projects 
which disproportionately benefit centrally located residents. However, while individual cash 
payments avoid the exacerbation of spatial asymmetries, they rarely overcome them due to their 
size. By failing to meaningfully address spatial inequities, the equal distribution of cash 
payments to all village residents simply perpetuate them. 
While our case study findings show that individual payments appear to be somewhat more 
successful than community projects in distributing benefits from REDD+ and FSC equitably, 
community projects do have some distinct advantages over individual cash payments that cannot 
be ignored. Many development challenges facing rural communities—such as inadequate or 
unhealthy drinking water, substandard medical and educational facilities, or a lack of important 
agricultural equipment or inputs—represent collective action problems in which cooperative 
community effort is needed in order to provide public goods. Community projects are in many 
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cases uniquely equipped to overcome these challenges in a way that individual cash payments 
alone cannot. 
4.2.3 Approaches for Enhancing Equity 
Our findings suggest that community projects have the potential to exacerbate underlying 
disparities and individual cash payments simply continue them. Yet, in order to ensure that 
community projects enhance equity within a community, specific measures can be taken to 
overcome spatial inequalities. One such method is to require that a certain percentage of 
community revenues be used for projects specific to each subvillage, with the proportions 
determined either by relative population or by differences in opportunity costs. This approach 
could be beneficial for the implementing organization as well as the community because 
payment for ecosystem services (PES) payments based on opportunity costs can increase 
effectiveness in forest conservation (Newton et al. 2012) and it could also be considered more 
equitable. Implementing community projects in this way would enable collective action to solve 
larger problems, while also ensuring that benefits do not accrue with political elites or residents 
living close to the village center. 
Some aspects of the REDD+ pilot project in Muungano provide positive examples of how 
program design and implementation can overcome pre-existing spatial asymmetries. TFCG 
concentrated a large portion of its education and outreach activities in Muungano’s two most 
distant subvillages. Its decision to locate conservation agriculture training and demonstration 
plots in these subvillages, which are more closely located to and dependent upon the forest, 
provides a useful example of a program implementation strategy that directly addresses the 
higher opportunity costs faced by these residents. Additionally, by providing bicycles to select 
residents of these distant subvillages, access constraints were likely partially overcome. 
Furthermore, with its next round of anticipated REDD+ payments, Muungano plans to build a 
primary school in the median zone of the village in order to address the challenges children from 
surrounding subvillages face in travelling to school in the village center. These are precisely the 
types of distributed community projects that effectively overcome the disadvantages facing 
distant program participants, and maximize the equitability of benefit distribution. 
Thus, while centralized community projects appear to exacerbate pre-existing spatial 
asymmetries, and individual cash payments appear to perpetuate them, dispersed community 
projects—implemented with an eye toward addressing spatial asymmetries—have the potential 
to ameliorate these disparities and increase individual satisfaction with the programs. However, 
payments are only one element of forest conservation programs, and attention should be paid to 
secondary outcomes. 
  
5.  Spatial Analysis of Participant Perceptions and Satisfaction 
Although payment mechanisms are a core component of forest conservation programs like 
REDD+ and FSC, other outcomes also have the potential to positively impact participating 
communities, and are similarly impacted by village spatial arrangements, including: 
1) Knowledge and understanding of program content and implementation activities; 
2) Participation in decision-making 
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Given the disparate, spatially driven variation of benefits from these programs, it is necessary to 
understand how physical location affects knowledge of and participation in REDD+  and FSC 
across demographics. The previous section of this paper illustrates that objective assessments are 
useful in informing program design, but participant perceptions are another equally important 
consideration in evaluating the degree to which these programs overcome spatial disparities. 
Therefore, knowledge and participation are explored below both objectively, and through 
measures of satisfaction with these outcomes. Both objective and subjective measures of 
program knowledge and participation are stratified geographically. 
 
We observed a negative relationship between access to the village center and the two outcomes 
mentioned above both objectively and subjectively (Table 6 and Table 7). Residents living in 
distant subvillages with limited access to the village center appeared less knowledgeable about 
the goals of REDD+ and FSC, less involved in village governance activities, and less satisfied 
with the programs overall. 
 
5.1 Measures of Effectiveness and Satisfaction of Knowledge Sharing and Decision Making 
Processes 
 
The following variables were selected to measure the effectiveness of and satisfaction with 
knowledge-sharing and decision-making processes of REDD+ and FSC at the community level 
(Table 4): 
1. Participation in rulemaking 
2. Clarity of forest rules 
3. Village General Assembly attendance 
4. Awareness of revenue information 
5. Basic understanding of program 
 
Each variable was tested for correlation with measures of wealth, education, age, gender, and 
access to the village center (Table 4 and Table 5). Results indicate that for many of the variables 
of interest, education was the most salient factor in predicting differences between respondents. 
However, given that each additional year of education reported by a respondent is associated 
with a 3.4%
1
 increase in the probability that the respondent will live within access zone one 
(p<0.05), this finding indicates that education and access are tightly linked, as respondents with 










                                                          
1
We used a linear probability model to regress access on wealth and education, where access was defined as a binary 
variable: “zone one=0” and “zones two to four=1.” We combined zones two to four to improve statistical power  
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Table 4. Description of key variables. 
Variable Name Description      
Dependent Variables               
Participation in Rulemaking Ordinal measure of participation in the formation of rules on forest use 
(Create Rules) and management, values from 0-3, Never=0; Often=4 
Clarity of Forest Rules Binary measure of clarity of rules in the conservation area of the forest, 
(Clarity Rules) Unclear=0; Clear=1 
Meeting Attendance Ordinal measure of village meeting attendance, values from 0-4  
(Meet) Never Attend=0; Always Attend=4 
Revenue Information Binary measure of whether adequate information on VNRC 
(Inform) revenues are provided to respondents, N=0; Y=1 
Independent Variables         
Distance (Dist) Ordinal measure of distance/access to village center, values from 1-4  
  Closest=1; Farthest=4  
Wealth 
Indexed measure of weighted averages of assets and food security, 
asset  
  values assigned from data collected in the field; values from -0.35-24.4 
Education (Educ) Number of years that respondent has attended school 
Age Number of years old of respondent 






Table 5. Mean values of key variables by village. 








Meet Inform Dist Wealth Educ Age Gend 
Muungano 23 0.217 0.957 1.43 0.087 2.13 4.97 3.48 36.96 0.17 
Nainokwe 25 1.36 0.92 2.32 0.6 1.72 5.19 6.08 45.4 0.36 










Table 6. Ordinary least square regression results for participation by village  
Independent 
Variables Dependent Variables 
  Participation in Rulemaking Meeting Attendance 
  Muungano Nainokwe Kikole Muungano Nainokwe Kikole 
Distance 0.313 -0.446** 0.019 -0.022 -0.075 0.035 
  (0.279) (0.224) (0.159) (0.371) (0.118) (0.30) 
Wealth -0.003 0.020 -0.053 -0.011 0.26** 0.015 
  (0.029) (0.092) (0.022) (0.077) (0.127) (0.051) 
Education 0.106 -0.064 0.080* 0.161* -0.042 0.31*** 
  (0.08) (0.082) (0.047) (0.095) (0.073) (0.065) 
Age 0.004 -0.012 0.015** 0.035 0.012 0.003 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.007) (0.031) (0.012) (0.016) 
Gender -0.026 -1.30** 1.17** -0.628 -0.275 -0.617 
  (0.271) (0.636) (0.60) (1.168) (0.703) (0.98) 
Intercept -0.936 3.42*** -0.665 -0.208 0.913 0.158 
  (0.70) (1.18) (0.594) (1.52) (1.31) (1.18) 
R^2 0.2271 0.2285 0.4189 0.2814 0.2668 0.3791 
Prob > F-stat 0.7781 0.288 0.1858 .0032** 0.0945* 0.00*** 
n 23 25 20 23 25 20 
(p<0.10*; p<0.05**; p<0.01***) 
Table 7. Ordinary least square regression results of knowledge by village 
Independent 
Variables Dependent Variables 
  Clarity of Rules Info on VNRC Revenue 
  Muungano Nainokwe Kikole Muungano Nainokwe Kikole 
Distance 0.016 -0.017 -0.12 0.133 -0.065 -0.16 
  (0.036) (0.055) (0.101) (0.091) (0.09) (0.112) 
Wealth -0.024 0.003 0.008 0.029 0.037 0.026* 
  (0.012) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.0347) (0.016) 
Education 0.0256* 0.008 0.066** 0.042 0.056** 0.058*** 
  (0.0145) (0.035) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021) 
Age 0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.0017 0.004 0.01* 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.0052) 
Gender -0.183 0.117 -0.233 -0.135 0.225 -0.041 
  (0.12) (0.098) (0.246) (0.142) (0.226) (0.22) 
Intercept 0.951*** 0.714 0.618 -0.4 -0.074 -0.15 
  (0.12) (0.324) (0.516) (0.25) (0.54) (0.47) 
R^2 0.1017 0.2225 0.2594 0.03912 0.2416 0.3583 
Prob > F-stat 0.9004 0.2784 0.0544* 0.5501 0.0245** 0.0002*** 
n 23 25 20 23 25 20 
(p<0.10*; p<0.05**; p<0.01***) 
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5.2 Community Level Knowledge Sharing 
The sharing of knowledge about forest conservation and management as a component of REDD+ 
and FSC is intrinsically beneficial in the three study sites, as many villagers rely on their forests 
for subsistence. With an understanding of basic forest management practices and the elementary 
details of program implementation, community members can increase their individual ability to 
participate in decision-making and forest governance activities. 
 
5.2.1 Mechanisms for Community Level Knowledge Sharing 
Knowledge is disseminated in the villages studied through many sources, including village-level 
meetings and word-of-mouth. In each village there are four Village General Assembly (VGA) 
meetings each year where the Village Council, the main governing body for the village, reports 
on all administrative matters. The Village Council and VNRC provide updates on REDD+ and 
FSC program status, report revenues, discuss rule changes, and present ideas for expenditures. 
Meetings can be long and hard to follow because of the breadth of issues covered. One 
participant in Muungano noted that sometimes he has to leave the meetings early to attend to his 
farm and misses out on discussions regarding REDD+ and the forest. 
Through our interviews with TFCG and MCDI officials, we learned that forest knowledge is also 
spread in the community through capacity-building programs. In Muungano, TFCG provides 
trainings on conservation agriculture, beekeeping and chicken keeping to select villagers, which 
are focused in the subvillages with higher REDD+ opportunity costs. The NGO encourages 
participants to teach their neighbors, friends and families about conservation agriculture to 
spread information throughout the village. TFCG and MCDI also build capacity through the 
VNRC in each village, teaching members about forest management, GPS tracking and forest 
monitoring. In Nainokwe and Kikole, MCDI also conducts trainings on fire breaking and forest 
patrolling for all villagers, and screens educational films about forest management and 
conservation in the main subvillage, a popular event. These opportunities to learn and engage 
with forest management material are open to all villagers, but those with the least access to the 
village center struggle to attend the trainings or may not even learn about the opportunities, 
decreasing their understanding and ability to participate in forest governance activities. 
5.2.2 Effectiveness of Knowledge Sharing Within the Community 
 
Several indicators are related to effective knowledge sharing within communities participating in 
REDD+ and FSC, including basic knowledge of the program and its revenues and rules.  
Household survey respondents were asked if they had heard about REDD+ and FSC in their 
village and if they could explain what the program entailed. Of the total respondents in 
Muungano, 81% had heard about REDD+, while 70% in Nainokwe and 80% in Kikole had heard 
about FSC. Marginalized groups including women, the elderly, and people who had difficulty 
accessing the main subvillage were less likely to know about REDD+ and FSC. For example, in 
a focus group interview with men in Nainokwe, the oldest participant, who was over 80 years 
old, had no understanding of FSC and had never heard of the program, despite living in the 
village center. He cited being too old to understand these matters. Furthermore, respondents in 
Kikole's least accessible subvillage reported that they rarely traveled to the village center for 
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informational meetings because it was too far away. These trends were observed in all three 
villages. Therefore, while knowledge of the programs seems to be widespread, variations exist 
among different demographic groups and geographic location. 
 
In addition to knowledge of a program’s existence, an understanding of benefit sharing is also 
important for evaluating REDD+ and FSC implementation strategies. One of the core outcomes 
of these programs is for villages to capture revenue from carbon sequestration or timber sales, 
and a widespread understanding of these sources of income can speak to the inclusivity of the 
programs. A majority of respondents (86% across all three villages) were aware of some aspects 
of the revenues generated by REDD+ and FSC. Despite this overall high level of understanding, 
important differences emerged among respondents in Nainokwe and Kikole based on spatial 
location. Knowledge of FSC revenue expenditures is negatively correlated with access to the 
village center, although this trend is not statistically significant (Table 7). This trend was not 
observed in Muungano, where all respondents had knowledge of the REDD+ individual cash 
payment, regardless of subvillage location. This is likely because every Muungano resident 
received an individual cash payment, whereas in Nainokwe and Kikole revenues were used for 
community projects located in the village center. 
 
Finally, knowledge of REDD+ and FSC rules and regulations are important in achieving 
program success and community buy-in. The rules are generally clear to villagers; however, 
some trends show that perceptions of the clarity of rules are affected by education, holding 
constant other variables (Table 7). . As one becomes more educated, it may be easier to 
understand fully the rules and how they pertain to the forest program. As previously described, 
education levels are negatively correlated with access to the main subvillage, a factor that 
perpetuates and compounds the marginalization of distant residents. 
 
5.2.3 Satisfaction with Outcomes of Knowledge Sharing 
 
Objective measures of knowledge sharing glean valuable information about the effectiveness of 
program implementation. In contrast, subjective measures provide insight into participants’ 
satisfaction with implementation, an important indicator for program buy-in.  
 
When household survey respondents were asked if they felt they had sufficient information about 
revenues and expenditures managed by the VNRC, only 36.7% of respondents in Kikole, 56.7% 
of respondents in Nainokwe, and 11.4% of respondents in Muungano felt that they were well 
informed. These numbers indicate that an insufficient amount of information is disseminated 
about revenues and expenditures pertaining to forest activities, especially in Muungano. 
Regression results indicate that education is the most important factor determining satisfaction 
with information on FSC revenues, holding other variables constant (p<0.01) (Table 7), and 
Muungano shows a similar positive trend for REDD+ revenues. Since education is negatively 
correlated with distance, these two variables both play a role in understanding satisfaction with 
REDD+ and FSC revenues and expenditures. Therefore, more educated respondents, who tend to 
live nearer to the village center, are more satisfied with their level of knowledge and information 
about REDD+ and FSC.  
 
In summary, analysis of knowledge sharing reveal that spatial asymmetries have an impact on 
this intangible benefit of REDD+ and FSC within each community. This is similar to our result 
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that spatial dynamics affect tangible cash and in-kind payments. Therefore, as residents become 
more isolated from the village center, they are less likely to benefit from program outcomes. 
5.3 Decisions Made at the Community Level  
Knowledge and understanding of REDD+ and FSC are important in determining the extent to 
which an individual can participate in forest governance in their community. However, decision-
making structures themselves are a significant determinant for the effectiveness of and 
satisfaction with decision-making abilities for participants. Everything from meeting locations to 
how options are presented to community members influences the outcomes of decisions made. 
5.3.1 Community Level Decision Making Structures 
The only public venue for decision-making available to all villagers is the VGA, where attendees 
vote on issues of program participation, revenue distribution, contractual agreements, and the 
location and size of conserved areas. However, the Village Council and VNRC create initial 
proposals for program implementation before the VGA. 
REDD+ and FSC decision-making processes fit with preexisting governance structures in each 
village. Under Participatory Forest Management (PFM) in Tanzania, the Village Council is the 
highest authority and decision-making body in a village, while the VNRC acts as its implementer 
for natural resource management (Nzunda et al. 2011, Zahabu et al. 2009). Decisions concerning 
the management and program design of REDD+ and FSC are vetted through these bodies before 
reaching the VGA. Village Council meetings, open exclusively to Council members, are one 
arena for decision-making where members liaise with NGOs and formulate proposals for 
community projects and benefit-sharing mechanisms. These are then presented for approval at 
the VGA. The VNRC also creates proposals through closed meetings, in which members suggest 
program expenditures for VNRC forest activities and community projects. 
It is important to note that both the Village Council and VNRC have significant influence over 
the ultimate outcomes of the VGA and their proposals for REDD+ and FSC implementation are 
often accepted without amendments. 
5.3.1 Effectiveness of Decision Making Structures 
 
Decision-making in REDD+ and FSC programs in Southeastern Tanzania is deliberately 
designed to be as inclusive as possible. Community participation in the design and 
implementation of REDD+ and FSC is important for program buy-in, and feeling excluded can 
lead participants to have low levels of satisfaction, either with the program as a whole or with 
their role in the program. Most community members participate in program management and 
decision making by attending VGA meetings.  
 
Access was often acknowledged as a barrier to meeting attendance during household interviews. 
One woman in Kikole living in Zone Three did not feel comfortable going to village meetings 
because she did not know anyone, it was far away, and she did not feel welcomed. This response 
speaks to the perceptions of both geographic and social marginalization often expressed by 
residents of distant subvillages. Furthermore, members in Zone Two of Kikole mentioned that 
the meetings are hard to attend because they have to ford a river to reach the town center. 
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Additionally, respondents in the most distant subvillage of Nainokwe mentioned that the long 
distance to the village center keeps them from attending meetings.  
 
This dynamic is further supported and complicated through analysis of access and participation 
in rule making regarding the forest, which is most often facilitated through voting and approving 
rules at the VGA. In Nainokwe, access to the village center is negatively correlated with 
participation in rule making (Table 6). In addition to the village center being inaccessible, a 
Nainokwe VNRC member from the farthest subvillage reported resigning from his position 
because he felt that his opinion was disregarded and he could not participate actively in the 
meetings. Marginalized members of the subvillage feel disempowered and refuse to participate 
in part because of the perception that the Village Council and the VNRC disproportionately serve 
elite community members. This attitude was especially prevalent in Muungano, where people 
who lived farther away from the main subvillage felt that individual dissent would not change 
the opinions of village leaders. Many of these distant residents avoided active participation in the 
rule making process, choosing instead only to agree with what was proposed.  
 
Without participating in village proceedings and the management of forest conservation 
programs, residents of distant subvillages cannot vote or voice their collective opinions about 
REDD+ and FSC implementation, and therefore have less influence in program management. 
 
5.3.2 Satisfaction with Outcomes of Decision-making  
 
As stated above, objective measures are critical for understanding the effectiveness of decision-
making spaces. However, subjective measures indicate satisfaction with the ultimate outcomes of 
these spaces. One such indicator is participants’ satisfaction with expenditures resulting from 
REDD+ and FSC, as they are decided on at the VGA. Therefore, widespread dissatisfaction with 
expenditures would indicate that the VGA, as a decision making space, is unsatisfactory for 
participants. 
 
Analysis of the villages participating in FSC—Nainokwe and Kikole—revealed a trend between 
access and satisfaction with program revenue and expenditures. Respondents with less access to 
the village center were generally less satisfied, most likely because community projects were 
implemented solely in the village center. When analyzing Nainokwe and Kikole separately, it is 
clear that dissatisfaction is stronger in Nainokwe as access decreases. For example, 50% of 
respondents from the farthest subvillage in Nainokwe felt that the Village Government was 
neglecting to distribute expenditures in their subvillage. Many of the residents wanted schools, 
water taps, and clinics built in their subvillage which lacked even these most basic social 
services. 
This spatial trend was similar but more complex in Muungano. When asked if the individual cash 
payment received by each village resident was fair, 58% of respondents living closest to the 
village center, 22% of respondents living in the median zone, and 64% of respondents living 
farthest away responded positively. This interesting pattern may be due to three characteristics of 
program implementation and demographics in Muungano. First, respondents living farthest away 
from the village center are on average the most poor in the village and their response may 
indicate that the cash payment received was proportionately larger for them. Second, community 
projects such as the purchase of school furniture and construction of village offices were 
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established within the zone closest to the center. Finally, conservation agriculture was 
established in the farthest zone as a component of REDD+. This resulted in participants in the 
closest and farthest zones benefiting more from REDD+ than those living in the median zone 
who received neither training in conservation agriculture nor community projects in their 
subvillages.  
Overall, satisfaction with REDD+ and FSC revenues and expenditures was again most strongly 
influenced by access to the village center. Aspects of program implementation by each NGO 
further complicated this relationship, and at times partially overcame the potential 
marginalization of distant subvillage residents. Thus, although access is a key component 
contributing to satisfaction at the community level, program design and implementation can be 




In conclusion, REDD+ and FSC design and implementation can exacerbate, ameliorate, or 
perpetuate preexisting spatially driven inequity in Southeastern Tanzania. An important 
opportunity to address spatial disparity is presented in the thoughtful design of benefit-sharing 
mechanisms and inclusion techniques. We recommend that NGOs have a strong understanding 
of community-level dynamics prior to program implementation, and construct benefit-sharing 
mechanisms thoughtfully by addressing this context. We also suggest that benefit-sharing is most 
effective when a combination of individual payments and geographically dispersed community 
projects are established to address spatial inequity and compensate for the opportunity costs 
associated with the participation of REDD+ and FSC, many of which are higher for community 
members living in distant subvillages. Implementing these techniques will not only improve 
objective, quantifiable measures of disparity, including income and the capture of in-kind 
benefits, but can also increase levels of participation and individual satisfaction with a program, 
and therefore buy-in and compliance. Application of these lessons to other REDD+ and FSC 
programs in developing countries across the globe could contribute to the achievement of more 
equitable and inclusive outcomes for REDD+ and FSC participants. 
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